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SYMPOSIUM: THE RELIGION CLAUSES IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 
INTRODUCTION 
William P. Marshall* 
Vivian E. Hamilton** 
John E. Taylor*** 
On Apri112 and 13, 2007, the West Virginia University College of Law 
and the American Constitution Society for Law and Policy hosted a symposium 
entitled The Religion Clauses in the 21st Century. It was our privilege to organ-
ize the symposium, and we are pleased to be able to present its proceedings in 
this issue of the WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW. 
Few subjects in American constitutional law capture the public's inter-
est and inflame its passions more than the First Amendment's Religion Clauses. 
The recent history of those Clauses has given the public and the legal academy 
plenty to talk about. Over the past two decades, the Rehnquist Court made sub-
stantial changes to free exercise law through its decision in Employment Divi-
sion, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith' and to Establishment 
Clause funding law through a line of cases culminating in Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris.2 The Rehnquist Court also adopted Justice O'Connor's "endorsement 
test" to evaluate government religious speech/ though the Court's commitment 
to this test was called into doubt by its 2005 decisions in two cases involving 
government displays of the Ten Commandments.4 Today, the Roberts Court 
may be on the verge of further doctrinal change. It has already moved to limit 
standing under the Establishment Clause, 5 and Steven Gey suggests in his con-
tribution to this symposium that it will eventually move to deconstitutionalize 
Establishment Clause issues altogether by allowing church-state disputes to be 
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resolved through local political processes.6 In light of all these doctrinal shifts, 
we thought the time was ripe for an examination of what the Religion Clauses 
will mean as we move further into the 21st Century. We invited some of the 
country's leading scholars to Morgantown, West Virginia, to help us conduct 
that examination. 
The symposium included four panels organized around different themes 
as well as featured addresses by two of the most influential scholars currently 
writing about the law of church and state, Steven Gey and Douglas Laycock. 
The oral presentations and discussions during the symposium were consistently 
engaging. As participants listened to each other during the symposium and re-
vised their work over the summer, the dialogue begun in Morgantown was car-
ried to another level. These papers provide an invaluable window on the current 
state of Religion Clauses doctrine and theory. 
Steven Gey's paper prepares us for Life After the Establishment 
Clause.1 He predicts that in the next few years the Roberts Court will continue a 
paradigm shift in Establishment Clause jurisprudence that will completely dis-
place any remaining vestiges of separationism with an approach that would in-
tegrate church and state: Gey discusses five key themes of this new integration-
ist approach and suggests that together they endorse a frankly majoritarian ap-
proach to church-state issues that is both inconsistent with the best of our consti-
tutional heritage and insensitive to the country's changing religious demograph-
ics. He concludes, however, that this integrationist approach will not be viable 
over the long haul and that the pendulum will swing back towards separationism 
in the not too distant future. 
Douglas Laycock's paper, Substantive Neutrality Revisited,8 narrates the 
history of one of his best-known ideas and defends it against alternative propos-
als made by Steven Gey and Noah Feldman. The norm of substantive neutrality 
directs that government should seek to systematically minimize its impact on 
private religious choices, and Laycock contends that it offers a coherent and 
normatively attractive approach to issues of church and state. He further argues 
that substantive neutrality can largely explain the votes of median Justices Ken-
nedy and O'Connor and consequently can explain much of the Rehnquist 
Court's approach to the Establishment Clause (if not the Free Exercise Clause). 
The papers from the first symposium panel, "The Religion Clauses in 
Institutional Contexts," explore the functioning of the Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses in the context of two extremely important government institu-
tions: the military and the public schools. Chip Lupu and Robert Tuttle present 
the most thorough treatment yet written of the constitutional issues surrounding 
the military chaplaincy.9 They argue that the existence of the chaplaincy is best 
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seen and defended as a permissible accommodation of the religious needs of 
service personnel. Lupu and Tuttle then apply the law of religious accommoda-
tions to several specific issues regarding the military chaplaincy that have pro-
voked controversy in recent years, including the policies used in hiring, promot-
ing, and retaining chaplains; the content of chaplains' prayers during official 
service functions, and the propriety of proselytizing by chaplains in certain pas-
toral care settings. In a detailed response to Lupu's and Tuttle's paper, Steven 
Green argues that most courts and commentators have underestimated the sever-
ity of the Establishment Clause problems raised by the military chaplaincy .10 
Green agrees with Lupu and Tuttle that the chaplaincy is best defended as an 
accommodation of religion, but suggests that the current law of religious ac-
commodations may need to become more permissive for the chaplaincy to pass 
muster under an honest analysis. 
Turning from the military context to the public schools, Kristi Bow-
man's paper explores the parameters of the protection the Free Speech Clause 
provides for student religious expression. 11 Focusing on some recent cases in-
volving student T -shirts with provocative religious messages, she asks whether 
school suppression of those messages under the standards adopted in Tinker v. 
Des Moines Independent Community School District12 would constitute uncon-
stitutional viewpoint discrimination. Through a careful reading of all the 
Court's student speech precedents including its recent decision in Morse v. Fre-
derick, 13 Bowman suggests that the law of student speech may allow schools to 
discriminate against religious viewpoints that prove especially disruptive or that 
unduly interfere with the rights of others. John Taylor responds to Bowman's 
article by explaining how and why the Free Speech Clause rather than the Free 
Exercise Clause has come to be the primary protector of student religious 
speech in the public schools. 14 He argues that the dominance of the Free Speech 
Clause is constitutionally necessary, for any use of the Free Exercise Clause to 
privilege religious speech because of its religious character would be impermis-
sible content discrimination under the Speech Clause. 
The next set of papers emerged from the symposium panel on "Gov-
ernment Religious Expression," always a contentious issue in public debates 
about the Religion Clauses. The principal papers here both take their starting 
points from the Supreme Court's fractured decisions in McCreary County v. 
ACLU of Kentucky15and Van Orden v. Perry. 16 In their contribution, Fred Ge-
10 Steven K. Green, Reconciling the Irreconcilable: Military Chaplains and the First Amend-
ment, IIO W.VA. L. REv. I67 (2007). 
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dicks and Roger Hendrix explore the implications of Justice Scalia's arguments 
in his McCreary County dissent that the Establishment Clause allows govern-
ment to endorse monotheism. 17 They show that Justice Scalia's position is the 
latest attempt to invoke a Judeo-Christian "civil religion" as a force that can 
unify a diverse nation, but argue that this project is doomed to failure because 
the changing demographics of religion in the United States make it increasingly 
difficult to believe that a Judeo-Christian civil religion-or any civil relig-
ion-can produce unity rather than division. This is all the more true, they sug-
gest, because the supposedly inclusive symbols of American civil religion are 
increasingly understood to carry sectarian messages associated with conserva-
tive forms of Christianity. Steven Smith challenges this last claim, which he 
dubs the "sectarianization thesis," in his response to Gedicks and Hendrix. 18 
According to Smith, it does not follow as a conceptual matter that the inclusive 
character of civil religion is illusory simply because some people may attach 
specific, sectarian meaning to public religious symbols like Ten Command-
ments monuments. This, Smith says, is just one more illustration of the truth 
that people often agree about generalities and disagree about specifics. Where 
this is so, usually both the agreement and the disagreement are real and should 
be acknowledged as such. Smith also sees little evidence that as an empirical 
matter people actually understand public religious symbols as a coded endorse-
ment of conservative Christian values. The real question, Smith says, is whether 
we want to undermine the legitimating and unifying force that public religious 
symbols may still possess when it is unclear what can replace their role as 
sources of political community. 
Dan Conkle takes his cue from Justice Breyer's Van Orden concur-
rence, exploring the possibility that we might abandon the search for a rule-
based approach to evaluating government religious expression under the Estab-
lishment Clause and instead adopt a more flexible standard that would consider 
four variables: the degree to which the government's religious expression in-
volves coercion or aggressive imposition of a religious message, the nature and 
specificity of the expression (e.g., prayer vs. affirmation, sectarian vs. nonsec-
tarian), the traditional character of the expression, and the degree to which the 
expression might be seen as private rather than public. 19 While Conkle remains 
ambivalent about whether such a standard-based approach would be jurispru-
dentially wise, he demonstrates its utility in explaining the pattern of the Su-
preme Court's decisions on government religious expression._ 
17 Frederick Mark Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Uncivil Religion: Judea-Christianity and the 10 
Commandments, II 0 W. VA. L. REv. 2 7 5 (2007). 
18 Steven D. Smith, "Sectarianizing" Civil Religion?: A Comment on Gedicks and Hendrix, 
IIO W.VA. L. R.Ev. 307 (2007). 
19 Daniel 0 . Conkle, The Establishment Clause and Religious Expression in Governmental 
Settings: Four Variables in Search of a Standard, II 0 W.VA. L. REv. 3I5 (2007). 
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The third panel of the symposium was entitled "Accommodation of Re-
ligion." The papers by Kent Greenawalt20 and Carl Esbeck21 both attempt to 
synthesize the Supreme Court's case law concerning the degree to which the 
Establishment Clause limits discretionary governmental accommodations of 
religious practice. They differ largely in their degrees of optimism about the 
extent to which a satisfying and decision-guiding synthesis can be achieved. 
Greenawalt's contribution identifies a number of factors that seem critical for 
determining when government has crossed the line that separates permissible 
accommodation from forbidden establishment. A valid accommodation must 
(1) relieve a relevant burden on religious practice, (2) not grant relief far more 
extensive than the burden to which it responds, (3) not be intrinsically unconsti-
tutional (e.g., because it assigns political authority to a religious group), ( 4) not 
impose unacceptable burdens on those who do not benefit from the accommoda-
tion, and (5) classify beneficiaries in an appropriate (e.g., denominationally neu-
tral) way. These factors help courts to focus on the proper questions, but often 
they do not eliminate the need for line-drawing that turns on "subtle nuances" 
and "matters of degree. ,.22 Responding to Greenawalt, Esbeck grounds his ac-
count of accommodation on the Establishment Clause principle he labels "vol-
untaryism," meaning "that government is not to be actively involved in funding 
or otherwise supporting organized religion as religion."23 So understood, the 
Establishment Clause is "pro-religious freedom" but not "pro-religion." For 
Esbeck, it follows that efforts to accommodate religion are generally permissi-
ble. He argues that the law of accommodations is a good deal simpler and more 
predictable than is commonly thought, and formulates ten "black-letter" rules 
that summarize this law. 
Angela Carmella's paper moves to somewhat different ground within 
the general territory of religious accommodations.24 She proposes a unified 
approach to both legislative and judicial religious exemptions which would be 
guided by the question of whether particular exemptions serve the common 
good as that concept is understood in Catholic social thought. In her view, this 
approach calls religious institutions and individuals to responsible freedom. 
Exemptions need not be seen as a license to ignore the common good; instead, 
they may rest on a recognition that the ethical and legal norms of religious 
communities may guide conduct towards the common good as effectively as the 
norms laid down the state. In her response to Carmella's paper, Laura Un-
derkuffler emphasizes the extent to which Carmella's approach involves a radi-
2° Kent Greenawalt, Establishment Clause Limitations on Free Exercise Accommodations, II 0 
W.VA. L. REV. 343 (2007) . . 
21 Carl H. Esbeck, When Accommodations for Religion Violate the Establishment Clause: 
Regularizing the Supreme Court's Analysis, 110 W.VA. L. REv. 359 (2007). 
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23 
Greenawalt, supra note 20, at 357. 
Esbeck, supra note 21, at 396. 
24 Angela C. Cannella, Responsible Freedom Under the Religion Clauses: Exemptions, Legal 
Pluralism, and the Common Good, 1 l 0 W. VA. L. REV. 403 (2007). 
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cal departure from the way we ordinarily think about religious exemptions?5 
The usual approach is to think that religious exemptions are justifiable, if they 
are, because the state is not competent to question or assess claims of religious 
value. In contrast, to evaluate religious exemption claims by reference to the 
common good is to openly acknowledge that the state must judge religions 
against its own schemes of value. For Underkuffier, however, appreciating the 
radicalism of Carmella's proposal is a prelude to praise rather than scorn. She 
suggests that in the long run religious exemptions may only be sustainable in 
American society on terms similar to those proposed by Carmella. 
The final set of papers was initially presented during a symposium panel 
on "Religion and Politics." Naomi Cahn and June Carbone address this theme 
by exploring the influence of religious belief on the regulation of sexuality in 
general and on abstinence-only sex education in particular.26 They document 
the ways in which the much-discussed gap between "blue states" and "red 
states" tends also to track degrees of religious affiliation and different attitudes 
toward sex and its regulation by the government. Cahn and Carbone argue that 
government policies requiring abstinence-only sex education represent an un-
healthy melding of religion and politics, for the available evidence suggests that 
abstinence-only education is ineffective in preventing teenage pregnancy and 
the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. In her response to Cahn and Car-
bone, Vivian Hamilton emphasizes the ways in which they seem to embrace a 
fairly robust version of the ideal of public reason and questions whether that 
commitment can be fully justified and defended.27 While she shares Cahn's and 
Carbone's reservations about abstinence-only sex education, she suggests that 
there may be no practical alternative to allowing state experimentation with dif-
ferent approaches and hoping that an appreciation of policy consequences will 
ultimately prove more influential than religious ideology. 
Like Cahn, Carbone, and Hamilton, Eduardo Pefialver is also concerned 
with the proper role of religious argument in public political deliberation. He 
manages to shed new light on that complex and much-discussed topic by asking 
whether the ideal of public reason might prove counterproductive. 28 Advocates 
of public reason, who insist (with varying degrees of stringency) on the exclu-
sion of religious arguments from public deliberation, typically claim that a 
commitment to public reason is necessary to avoid the social instability that 
might otherwise result from our significant levels of religious pluralism. Pefial-
ver argues, however, that pluralism can also enhance political stability by caus-
25 Laura S. Underkuffier, Religious Exemptions and the Common Good: A Reply to Professor 
Carmel/a, 110 W.VA. L. REv. 449 (2007). 
26 Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Deep Purple: Religious Shades of Family Law, 110 W.VA. 
L. REv. 459 (2007). 
27 Vivian E. Hamilton, Religious v. Secular Ideologies and Sex Education: A Response to 
Professors Cahn and Carbone, 110 W.VA. L. REv. 501 (2007). 
28 Eduardo M. Pefialver, Is Public Reason Counterproductive?, II 0 W. VA. L. REV. 515 
(2007). 
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ing groups to moderate the demands they make of one another. Whether reli-
gious pluralism under a given set of social conditions tends to promote or un-
dermine stability is an empirical question that is difficult to answer, but the an-
swer has significant implications for the public reason debate. If religious plu-
ralism actually promotes stability, insisting that religious groups abandon their 
native vocabularies for those offered by public reason could undermine political 
stability rather than promoting it. 
We close this Introduction by expressing our thanks to all the partici-
pants whose work gave shape to our vision for a symposium on The Religion 
Clauses in the 21st Century. We also owe thanks to the many people at the 
American Constitution Society and the West Virginia University College of 
Law who gave their time and talents to the symposium. Finally, we thank the 
editors and staff of the WEST VIRGINIA LAw REVIEW for the hard work and 
professionalism they have demonstrated in producing this special symposium 
ISSUe. 
